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Abstract
The study discusses the role of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in dispute
resolution and examines issues influencing its effectiveness. This paper
investigates the trade disputes between the US and the European Union,
focusing on the agricultural sector controversies over crops, beef, and bananas
in addition to the conflict over the US government decision to impose tariffs on
imported low-cost steel. The final sections of the paper highlight some of the
structural factors that create limitation in the role of the WTO in resolution of
disputes and provide analyses with the potential of enhancing the capabilities
of the WTO in resolving trade disputes.
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Introduction
The transatlantic trade of goods and services between the US and
the European Union (EU) is the largest in the world, 45% of global
services and 38% of goods, which amounts to more than $750
billion (Hocking and McGuire, 2002). Most EU and US firms trade
amicably across borders. However, in this era of economic
integration pacts, the complexity of international trade has gone
beyond the traditional transfer of capital, goods, and services.
Special issues – the environment, consumer safety and health,
supply networks, and maintaining the competitive advantage of
domestic firms – have created complex factors influencing
domestic policies, trade barriers, and the definition of protectionism, tax breaks, subsidies, and standards of health and safety.
In the US, trade policies are mostly drawn based upon the private
sector’s interests, with the influence of strong lobbying groups
(Jacek, 2000). In the EU, the European Commission (EC) is the
deciding entity on policy making, with lobbying and special
interest groups becoming more active (Hocking and McGuire,
2002). With the growing power of lobbying and special interest
groups, international economic transactions are increasingly
intertwined with political and domestic issues beyond the traditional concern for producer-protectionist measures.
In this paper, the role of the World Trade Organization in dispute
resolution is analyzed in reference to two important areas of trade
disputes between the US and the EU – agriculture and steel. These
cases exemplify the effectiveness of the WTO in settling various
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trade disputes. Furthermore, the paper highlights
structural factors that limit the capabilities of the
WTO in resolving disputes.

World Trade Organization
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), the predecessor to the WTO, dealt with
the international trade disputes through a negotiation-based system and the decisions rendered by
the dispute resolution panel of GATT had to be
adopted by all parties involved (Brewster, 2006).
Such decisions could be negotiated by the disputing
bodies. However, any party involved in a dispute
could block the decision of the panel or prolong
the implementation of the decisions rendered by
the WTO (Brewster, 2006).
During the Uruguay Round of trade negotiation
between 1986 and 1993, an agreement was reached
to establish the WTO with the ability to rule if a
country’s trade policies were discriminatory to
foreign companies. The WTO has a systematic
rule-based approach to resolution of disputes. The
decisions rendered by the WTO cannot be blocked
by the parties involved and the losing party is
mandated to abide by the rulings of the WTO.
The WTO consists of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU), which provides the rules
and regulations for trade disputes, the Disputing
Settlement Body (DSB) with the power to establish
a panel for the review of the disputes and to oversee
reports, rulings, and their implementation, a standing Appellate Body and procedures to monitor the
implementation of the rulings and to oversee the
amount of compensation and retaliation.
The DSU regulates the DSB’s activities. The DSB
starts negotiations for a settlement among the
disputing parties with a mandatory consultation.
If the disputing parties cannot agree within a
certain period of time, the complainant party can
ask the DSB for the establishment of a panel to
review the case. The panel’s decisions, based upon
fact-finding and the policies of the WTO, are then
provided in a report within 6 months. If neither of
the parties agrees with the findings of the panel,
they can then appeal the decision to the Appellate
Body. The task of the Appellate Body is to review
and interpret the panel’s findings based on the legal
issues. The panel’s decisions can be upheld,
reversed, or modified by the Appellate Body. With
the Appellate Body’s decision, the losing party has
30 days to comply or ask for a ‘‘reasonable period of
time,’’ preferably within 15 months, to comply.
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In the case of non-compliance, the complainant
can ask the DSB for negotiation over compensation.
If the defendant disputes the implementation of
the compensation, the measures will be further
reviewed by the DSB and retaliatory actions can be
authorized, usually in the form of punitive tariffs.
In the following sections, three cases of trade
disputes between the US and the EU that were
brought to the WTO are examined to demonstrate
the extent of effectiveness and the capabilities of
the WTO in settling trade disputes.

Agriculture Industry
Trade barriers on agricultural products are among
the strictest policies enforced by governments. The
issues of food safety and related trade policies are
the sources of important disputes that have challenged the WTO. The past decade has seen major
trade disputes between the US and the EU on
agricultural products. Hormone-raised cattle, genetically engineered crops, and the banana disputes
have caused great controversy.
Hormone-treated beef dispute
Hormone-raised cattle compose more than 90% of
beef produced in the US and Canada (Isaac, Banerji,
and Woolcock, 2000). The history of the dispute
between the US and the EU on hormone-treated
beef started in 1981 when the EC banned the meat
of livestock raised with growth hormones in their
feed due to alleged potential health issues for prepubescent children (Wuger, 2002). As a result, in
1987, the US asked GATT for the establishment of a
scientific group to investigate the EC ban. The EC
rejected this request, and in 1988 it banned the use
of all hormones in food products with the exception of three natural hormones under specific
conditions.
However, due to the threat of retaliation by the
US, the EC postponed the implementation of this
decision for a year. After the EC ban went into effect
in 1989, the US retaliated by putting a 100% tariff
on eight agricultural products from the EU (Wuger,
2002). In 1996, the US terminated its retaliation
due to the request by the EC and asked for a panel
to address the ban by the EC. In 1997, the panel
ruled against the EC for the breach of the Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) Agreement.
Article 5 (7) of the SPS Agreement stipulates that
scientific proof must guide the standards of food
safety and that precautionary measures can be used
only temporarily to allow for the scientific information to be gathered.
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The follow-up appeal by the EC resulted in some
latitude by the Appellate Body. It allowed the EU to
have domestic health and safety protection standards more stringent than the international measures; however, the burden of the scientific
justification was put on the EC. In response to the
WTO ruling, the EC posited that the scientific
research in this area was not sufficient to cover the
future and long-term risk of using hormones;
therefore, beef produced using hormones could
pose unforeseen threats to the public health. The
follow-up review by the WTO sided with the US and
Canada and ruled that the EC did not provide any
scientific evidence contrary to the current research
and that its expectations for health standards went
beyond the acceptable international requirements.
Despite this ruling, the EC kept the ban on
hormone-treated beef and opted for a retaliatory
act. The US estimated the beef export to the EU to
be valued at $116.8 million annually and Canada’s
estimate was $8.00 million (Kerr and Hobbs, 2002).
As a result, the US and Canada put a 100% tariff on
imported EU products such as truffles, cheese, and
bottled water. The continuation of the dispute and
the decision of the US and Canada to keep the
suspension have resulted in formation of another
panel to review the matter (WTO, 2006, 2008).

Genetically modified crop dispute
Another source of trade controversy between the
EU and the US is the case of genetically modified
(GM) crops such as corn, soybeans, and cotton. GM
crops provide a genetic insecticide that eliminates
the use of extensive chemicals to eradicate pests.
The GM crops were to be used for animal feed only
since the environmental impact and the potential
risks to humans and other animals and crops
needed further research. But GM corn found its
way in taco products across the globe (Hsin, 2002).
In addition, Canadian government research on GM
wheat and rapeseed and the potential of dispersion
of pollens to wider areas raised the alarm about the
introduction of foreign genes into the ecosystem
(Hsin, 2002).
In 1997, the EC approved the import of GM
soybeans and allowed cultivation of GM corn.
However, the outbreak of mad cow disease and
the public furor over the failure of the British
government to regulate cattle feed resulted in the
ban of the import and cultivation of GM crops by
the EC (Hsin, 2002). According to the US government, this decision cost the US$600 million in corn
exports to the EU (Hsin, 2002).

In 2000, the US and Canada agreed to the EC’s
demand to label their GM products. However, the
EC used the same argument in banning hormonetreated beef, ‘‘precautionary principle,’’ to also
reject GM crops. Even though the ‘‘precautionary
principle’’ can be used only temporarily until the
gap in scientific information is filled, this principle
has been used as a means to permanently ban the
unwanted products from entering the EU. Furthermore, the EC, under pressure from environmental
and consumer groups, used the GATT’s labeling
policy and declared the GM agricultural products
as ‘‘novel products.’’ As a result, US agricultural
products that did not specify ‘‘genetically modified’’
on their labels were banned from entering the EU.
Moreover, in March 2003, the European agricultural ministers approved a strict food labeling policy
that contained labeling of foods with even less than
1% of GM ingredients. The US contended that this
could be used as a tool for differentiation among
suppliers and gaining competitive advantage over
the GM crop-producing farmers.
Similar to the hormone-treated beef case, consumer advocacy and environmental groups argued
that the interests of the large corporations were the
driving force behind the GM crop technologies. As
an example, US-based Monsanto Corporation,
which has control over gene modification technologies, tried to acquire a patent on a technology that
would prevent the seeds of GM crops from being
fertile. The outcry over this technology put the
corporation at odds with its claim that the GM
crops were the answer to solving the problem of
hunger in poor countries and provided ample
ammunition for the anti-GM crop advocacy groups.
The special interest groups opposed to the GM
crops argue that the world produces enough food to
combat world hunger, but logistics, pricing, and
low productivity of land in poor countries are
major underlying factors causing world hunger.
Hence, the answer to world hunger does not lie in
the genetic modification of crops, but in improved
distribution and irrigation systems, ways to
increase the productivity of the land, and better
pricing strategies. Based upon the request by the US
and Canada, a panel was established in 2004.
However, the panel’s final report has been further
delayed (WTO, 2006, 2008).

Banana dispute
The banana dispute had its origin in the Treaty of
Rome, which allowed Germany an annual quota for
bananas based on the imports for 1956. However,
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the old colonies and the current overseas territories
of the EU in the Caribbean, Africa, and the Pacific
could not compete with the Latin American banana
producers as far as efficiency, price, and quality. In
1975, in the Lomé Convention, the Caribbean,
African, and Pacific countries were given preferential treatment by the EU and measures were taken
to assist them in improving their operations and
marketing activities (McMahon, 1998).
Despite the preferential treatment and joint
assistance given to these countries, their banana
exports could still not compete against the Latin
American countries. Over the years, the discussion
regarding uniformity of banana tariff and quotas
continued, and in 1993 the EC affirmed the
traditional favorable status of the Caribbean,
African, and Pacific countries and set a quota for
the Latin American banana exporters.
The 1993 rules cut in half the EU market share of
the major US banana-exporting company, Chiquita
(formerly United Fruit). Over a period of 8 years,
the Chiquita Company contested the preferential
treatment of companies in the old and current
territories of Britain, Spain, and France. Ultimately,
the US, Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, and Ecuador took their complaint to the WTO and argued
that while the Lomé rules allowed for preferential
treatment of the Caribbean, African, and Pacific
countries at a certain level of banana export, the EU
had not only raised the level of imports from these
countries, but had also assisted in enhancing their
marketing, production, and other related activities,
which could be considered forms of subsidies.
Furthermore, they contended that the EU had
included countries not belonging to the traditional
favorable status countries, such as Colombia, Costa
Rica, and Venezuela (McMahon, 1998).
Britain, Spain, and France supported the restrictive quotas on bananas, but Belgium and Denmark
allowed imports from Latin America despite the
tariff, and Germany kept a free market (Stein,
2001). However, since production efficiency and
price competitiveness in the preferred territories
were not good, the price of their bananas was much
higher than the price of the bananas produced by
companies located in Latin America (Stein, 2001).
In pursuing the battle with the EU, the WTO
ruled in favor of the US government and the Latin
American complainants, but the EU refused to
change its restrictive and preferential quota system.
As a result, sanctions against the EU ensued,
including the ban of products such as coffee makers
and bath oils (Stein, 2001). In the summer of 2001,

Organization Management Journal

in response to retaliatory actions against the EU,
the restrictive and preferential quotas were abolished and a system was established very similar to
that prior to the quotas. According to this agreement, the favored countries’ share of the banana
export to the EU would decrease by 100,000 tons
and the US and Latin American companies would
have a greater access to the EU market (Ierley,
2002). In addition, the banana market is to be
governed by a general tariff system.
The outcome of the role of the WTO in resolving
the banana dispute was to place an important
barrier to the EU’s preferential treatment of particular countries. A goal of the Treaty of Rome has
been the inclusion of developing countries into
international trade and the improvement of their
economies. However, 30 years of preferential treatment of the banana countries of the Caribbean,
African, and Pacific have not helped in enhancing
their trade competitiveness. The WTO rulings in
the banana case recognized this dilemma and
recommended inter-regional trade agreements such
as the one among the Caribbean nations.

Steel dispute
In 2001, the American Iron and Steel Institute,
which is composed of 36 North American steel
companies, complained to the US International
Trade Commission (ITC) about low-cost imported
steel and the dumping of such steel in the US
market, which had reduced the market share for the
domestic companies and put their survival in
jeopardy. According to statistics provided by steel
companies, 46,000 jobs had been lost in the steel
industry in a span of 5 years and more than 300,000
would be lost due to low-cost imported steel
(Martinez, 2002). Subsidies in the steel industry,
as in the agricultural sector, are highly prevalent
across different countries. According to GATT, three
forms of subsidized assistance are allowed: research
and development, technologies to meet the new
environmental standards, and social assistance,
such as retirees’ health care cost (Cyert and
Fruehan, 1996). The US steel companies had a
difficult time to compete against the foreign steel
due to the subsidies provided to these companies by
their governments and also dumping of steel by some
foreign companies, such as South Koreans, Taiwanese,
and Canadians (Jesdanun, 1999; Levin, 1999).
In addition, the inefficiency of small steel
mills and the huge cost of pension and health
care of retired unionized steel employees were
added factors to the bankruptcy and the financial
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difficulty of the US steel industry (Boselovic, 2001).
As a result, the ITC recommended a tariff of 5–40%
on 10 different categories of imported steel over a
4-year period. Russia’s crude steel, Canada as a
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
partner, and most developing countries due to
insignificant amounts of exports, would be exempt
from this tariff. However, steel imports from
the EU, Norway, Switzerland, Japan, South Korea,
Taiwan, Brazil, China, and New Zealand would be
subjected to the tariff. In addition, the US steel
companies asked the government to subsidize the
huge deficit in the pension plan and health care
cost of the retired employees (Boselovic, 2001).
In March 2002, the US government imposed
tariffs, from 8 to 30%, on 14 categories of imported
steel with the support of both Democrat and
Republican representatives and senators from steel
states in the Midwest and the state of Pennsylvania.
Meanwhile, a strong opposition to steel tariffs
came from domestic industries such as automakers,
auto parts, molding, construction, and other customers of steel, and states such as Michigan, home
to the major auto manufacturing companies, and
Louisiana, a major port of embarkation of goods.
The steel-consuming industries argued that the US
steel plants could supply only 70–75% of the
domestic needs (Purchasing, 1999).
Hence, the tariff on steel would have a major
negative impact on downstream manufactures.
By closing the borders to foreign steel, with the
subsequent shortage and higher prices of steel, the
steel customers, with 8.3 million production workers (Purchasing, 1999), would have no choice but to
relocate or lose their competitive pricing and sales.
As a result, thousands of jobs in these sectors would
be lost in order to protect approximately 200,000
jobs in the steel industry. In addition, the threat of
retaliation by other countries, the costs of relocation to the steel-consuming companies, and the
disruption of their production activities could cost
the US economy billions of dollars.
Within 6 months of the imposed steel tariff, the
price of steel increased by 6%. Furthermore, due to
a shortage of steel, the spot market price was raised
by 30% and the price for scrap steel, a main product
for auto parts and smaller components for industrial machinery, was raised by 15–20%. In early
2003, the lobbying of auto companies and steel
customers against the tariffs intensified. The Consuming Industries Trade Action Coalition (CITAC)
heavily lobbied for the elimination of all steel
tariffs. Michigan’s Congressional Representative

introduced a resolution for the ITC to review
the consequences of the tariffs (Corbett, 2003).
Meanwhile, the steel industry countered that
the price focus of the auto companies was
the major reason that steel companies were in such
tight spot.
The pressure to eliminate the tariffs on imported
steel continued through reports that 200,000
domestic jobs in 2002 were lost as direct result of
imposing these tariffs (Phelps, 2003). In addition,
the EU, Japan, and six other countries reacted by
asking the WTO to arrange a consultation with the
US regarding the steel tariffs. Meanwhile, the EC
prepared a list of 316 US products with a value of $2
billion in case retaliation would be the final resort.
The WTO spent 9 months investigating the complaint. In July 2003, the WTO ruled in favor of the
complainants that the steel tariffs violated global
trade agreements and that the revenues from
these tariffs that went to the affected US steel
companies constituted illegal trade practices since
they were considered subsidies. The US position
was that the safeguard accord of the Marrakech
1994 world trade pact allowed countries to take
temporary measures to protect threatened domestic
industries.
However, the burden of proof that such industries’ survival is threatened is with the countries
that impose protectionist measures. In the case of
steel, the WTO ruled that the US failed to prove its
case. Under pressure from the domestic steel
customers, specifically the giant auto companies,
and the threat of retaliation by the EU, the US
government did not appeal the WTO ruling and
introduced 178 exclusions to tariffs on the steel
products. Even though this concession was a relief
for the domestic steel users and welcomed by the
EU, it was not enough for the EU to stop the threat
of trade retaliatory procedures. Ultimately, in
December 2003, the US government decided to
repeal the steel tariffs.

Issues impeding the success of the WTO as a
dispute resolution body
The WTO was created not only to reduce the period
of time that it took for GATT to deal with trade
disputes, but also to streamline the dispute settlement process. Under GATT, the losing party could
block the panel’s ruling; under the WTO this option
is not available. However, the losing parties have
found different tactics, such as creative interpretation of the WTO language, to delay or avoid
adoption of the WTO’s rulings.
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In the following sections, this paper examines the
issues and problems of the WTO that impede its
success in effectively resolving trade disputes. These
issues and problems are grouped into three categories that have varying degrees of complexity.
These categories consist of technical issues, conceptual issues, and functional issues. The technical
issues include problems that are related to the rules,
procedures, and the body of the language of the
WTO. These issues entail a lesser degree of complexity to address and alleviate. The issues in the
second category are related to the conceptual
foundation of the WTO – the economic and
political power differentials among the member
countries and the focus on supplier-related trade
barriers. These issues create more complicated
obstacles than the technical issues for effective
operations of the WTO.
The third category, the functional issues of the
WTO, is associated with the role of the WTO as a
unique international agency that can issue mandates and interfere with the domestic laws of
member countries. This category comprises the
most complicated issues of the WTO.
Table 1 provides a list of the related issues under
each proposed category.
Table 1 Categorization of the issues impeding the success of the
WTO as a dispute resolution body

1.

Technical issues:
a. Rules, policies, and procedures:
K Time-line
K Summary reports
K Secrecy
K Disputing parties
K Panel composition
K Bilateral negotiations
K Retaliatory acts
b. Language:
K SPS Agreement
K TBS Agreement
K Implementation of rulings

2.

Conceptual issues:
a. Inequality of power:
K Developing countries
b. Foundation:
K Supplier-specific focus

3.

Functional issues:
a. International mandates:
K International laws vs domestic laws
b. Standardization of the mandates:
K Differentiation vs harmonization
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Technical issues
The technical issues impeding the success of the
WTO in resolving trade disputes can be further
categorized as indicated in Table 1. These categories
include issues related to WTO’s rules and procedures and the DSU or the body of the language of
the WTO.
Rules, policies, and procedures. A concern with the
WTO’s conflict resolution process is the delay in
rendering decisions. The time frame for the panel
to issue its reports is within 6 months. If the panel
misses this deadline, the second deadline is within
9 months. However, meeting this timeline has been
an issue. Reviewing the timeline for 36 cases
brought to the panel from 1995 to 1999 indicates
that the panel has met the 6-month deadline for
only six cases and the 9-month deadline for five
cases (Stewart and Karpel, 2000). These delays on
one part are due to the length of the summary
reports, which according to the WTO policies are
generated based upon the complaint of each party
involved in a dispute. The hormone-treated beef
dispute reports, one for the US and one for Canada,
were each over 400 pages (Stewart and Karpel,
2000). Another reason for delay is requests of the
disputing parties for more time to conduct research
and prepare documents, as evident by the GM crop
and the hormone-treated beef cases.
One more point of discord is the issue of secrecy
and the lack of transparency in procedures, reports,
and public dissemination of these reports by the
WTO. According to the WTO rules, the disputing
parties must be governmental agencies. The WTO’s
rejection of the efforts of the US and the EU to
formalize the acceptance of unsolicited briefs by
private entities has resulted in more contention
(Hauser and Zimmermann, 2003). Hence, the
WTO’s refusal in involvement of all interested
parties (e.g., environmental and consumer advocacy groups) and the tendency of the WTO to reject
unsolicited reports from the third parties and its
unresponsiveness to such reports have added to
more controversy over the decisions rendered by
the WTO (Wallach, 2000).
Another issue at the center of the controversy
over the WTO procedures is that its rulings in
providing remedies are in the form of bilateral
negotiations since the WTO policies do not allow
multilateral negotiations. Another concern is the
lack of permanency in the composition of the
panel. Reviewing the composition of the panel in
51 cases brought to the WTO indicates that only
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three people served on four to five panels, seven
people on three, and the rest did not serve on more
than two panels (Stewart and Karpel, 2000). Hence,
the absence of permanency in the panel composition, which results in the lack of in-depth experience and expertise to deal with complicated
international and domestic trade laws, is an issue
that needs to be addressed.
Another concern in resolving the disputes under
the rules and procedures of the WTO is the standard
of review for the panel and the Appellate Body.
A controversy in this case is the appropriate
approach by the WTO panel and the Appellate
Body in reviewing a case. Should the panel and
the Appellate Body defer and rely upon the facts
provided by the disputing parties in assessing the
situation or should they forge ahead with their own
independent fact-finding and legal assessment of
the compliance of the disputing members with the
WTO rules and regulations (Oesch, 2003)?
Furthermore, a major contentious issue is the
nature of retaliatory acts and specifically the
‘‘carrousel retaliation’’ policy. When the losing
party opts not to abide by the rulings of the
WTO, the winning party has the right to retaliate
in the form of punitive tariffs. However, such
retaliatory acts are against industries that have
not been part of the dispute. For example, in the
case of hormone-treated beef, the US and Canada
retaliated against industries such as cheese, truffles,
and bottled water. In addition, ‘‘carrousel retaliation’’ allows the winning party to change the list of
‘‘sanctioned products’’ periodically, which again
retaliates against other industries that are not at the
center of the dispute.

Language. Other issues that impede the success of
the WTO as a dispute resolution body are related to
language of the DSU that is open to interpretation.
At the center of disputes over hormone-treated
beef and GM crops was the interpretation of
the standards of safety and health and the
‘‘precautionary principles’’ of the SPS Agreement
in addition to the concept of the ‘‘novel products’’
of the Technical Barriers to Trade or Standards
Codes (TBS) Agreement. Since the inception of
GATT in 1947, international trade barriers in the
form of tariffs have been lowered. However, more
complex and sophisticated rules and regulations
have replaced tariffs. Some of these new regulations
are formalized internationally in the SPS and TBS
articles undertaken in the Uruguay Round

Agreement of 1994. They deal with international
safety standards for food items.
The SPS Agreement ensures enhancement of food
quality and safety internationally and allows governments to put trade protectionist measures in
place to safeguard humans, animals, and plants. In
addition, the SPS Agreement recognizes nationspecific food health and safety regulations in regard
to food additives. Meanwhile, the TBS Agreement
deals with food labeling, food composition, packaging, and quality requirements.
These safety and health standards have provided
justification for many more trade barriers. Among
these barriers in the agriculture industry are new
safety and health regulations, environmental
considerations, animal cruelty issues, and barriers
based on ethical and moral grounds. These new
forms of trade barriers can reduce international
competition and create hurdles for foreign firms
entering a country, specifically firms from developing countries. Complicating the matter further is
the decision of GATT through the TBS Agreement
to require labeling the health risks for ‘‘novel
products.’’ Canada and the US claimed that the
EU’s demand for labeling information on GM
agricultural products and hormone-treated beef
did not fall under the category of ‘‘novel products.’’
They contended that the EU ban was not based
on sufficient scientific evidence, but was a
disguised trade barrier under the auspices of health
standards and that the EC had created a higher
level of health standards than the international
ones without any scientific substantiation (Roberts,
1998).
The language used in the SPS and the TBS
Agreements is not clear as to the definitions of
risk, ‘‘precautionary principles,’’ and the definition
of ‘‘novel products.’’ Under the SPS Agreement,
there is no definition as to the acceptable level of
safety risk. The vagueness of the language has
allowed different interpretations of the SPS and TBS
articles. The disputes over hormone-treated beef
and GM crops are prime examples of different
interpretations of the SPS and TBS provisions by
different parties.
Another issue related to the DSU language is the
implementation of the rulings of the WTO. The
losing party’s intention to comply is taken as a
willingness to implement the rulings; however, the
time frame and the actual implementation plan
are open to interpretation and compliance of the
losing and winning parties. The losing parties can
define the time needed to implement the rulings

Organization Management Journal

Linking theory and practice

Minoo Tehrani

142

and not comply with the 15-month implementation period.

American countries did not have the economic or
the political clout to resolve this issue.

Conceptual issues
The conceptual underpinning of the WTO is
another issue that has created hurdles in its
capability to effectively address and resolve trade
disputes. These conceptual issues include the
inequality of power among the member countries
and the constructional foundation of the WTO;
namely, its supplier-specific focus.

Foundation. The WTO’s role as the trade dispute
resolution body dealing with the issues of
hormone-treated beef dispute and GM crops was a
difficult one since precedent for such cases did not
exist. GATT did not provide similar case
background to allow established standards for the
WTO to settle these disputes. As a result, the role of
the WTO in resolving the disputes was clearly
tested. A major hurdle in the ability of the WTO not
only to resolve the trade disputes, but also to ensure
the implementation of its rulings, is that the
directives of the WTO and its predecessor, GATT,
have been supply-driven processes. GATT dealt with
tariff reduction policies; the WTO was established to
look at other protectionist policies, such as nonpriced-based barriers, but the focus of the removal of
non-priced-based barriers has been on barriers
created for protection of domestic producers. The
WTO’s interpretation of the EC sanction against
hormone-treated beef from the US and Canada was
as a traditional producer-protectionist act against
the scientific results (Kerr and Hobbs, 2002).
However, the force behind banning hormonetreated beef and GM crops came from consumers
and environmentalists in the EU. These forces in the
EU have become influential enough for governments to impose sanctions against products that
consumers and environmentalists feel are unsafe.
However, since the WTO does not have the
mechanisms to consider political and consumermotivated disputes, it has failed to effectively resolve
such trade disputes.

Inequality of power. Another factor for measuring
the degree of effectiveness of the WTO in conflict
resolution is the weight of economic and political
power of the complainants. The inequality of
economic and political power of developing
countries in imposing effective sanctions or
retaliatory acts has been a sensitive and contentious issue. The lack of retaliatory power by developing countries as evident in the banana case
between Ecuador and the EU brought about a
proposal by the developing countries for an
aggregate retaliation power that would allow the
winning parties to collectively sanction products of
the non-complying party. The WTO’s rejection of
this proposal has fueled anger among the
developing countries and increased hostility
toward the WTO.
Out of 140 members of the WTO, around twothirds are developing countries; however, the
disproportional economic power between these
countries and the developed countries has created
controversy over the fairness of the rules and
procedures of the WTO when applied to the
developing countries (Footer, 2001). The inequalities in the economic power of developing countries
vs the developed countries and their lack of
expertise in dealing with complex international
laws and the ineffectual retaliatory power have
added to the controversy.
Ierley (2002) conducted interviews with nine
WTO diplomat members from developing countries. According to these members, the lack of
economic power and retaliatory muscle do not
favor conflict resolution if developing countries are
the complainants against super powers. They consider the WTO’s process a ‘‘power-based system
rather than a rule-based system’’ (Ierley, 2002). An
example is the resolution of the banana dispute
with the EU that happened when the US joined
forces with the Latin American co-complainants.
Without the economic force of the US, the Latin
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Functional issues
The third category of issues that creates limitations
to the success of the WTO in dealing with disputes
is related to the role of the WTO as an international
entity. This category includes highly complicated
issues regarding international vs domestic laws and
the role of the WTO in prescribing standardized
mandates for the member countries.
International laws vs domestic laws. The
appropriateness of the standards that the panel
and the Appellate Body of the WTO employ to
review the trade disputes can create tremendous
controversy. These standards can be in conflict with
the national standards of the issues under dispute
(Oesch, 2003). For example, in the case of
hormone-treated beef, the standards of review of
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the Appellate Body were in conflict with the
national standards. As Oesch (2003) notes, which
standards should govern the decisions of the
panel – review of the findings at the domestic
level or conducting an independent fact-finding
assessment of the issues under dispute?
The rulings of the WTO can conflict with the
domestic laws of a country. According to US laws,
there are two limitations to the power of a treaty: A
treaty ‘‘may not permit a change in the character of
the government y and a treaty may not by its
terms or application violate the individual constitutional rights’’ (McBride, 2001: 666).
However, WTO rulings may infringe upon both of
these areas. The US Congress approved and signed
the WTO laws in 1994. However, it annexed a
provision to its approval stating that WTO decisions or laws that are contrary to US laws, including
any laws dealing with the protection of humans,
animals, plant life, health, and the environment,
shall have no effect (McBride, 2001). According to
the US Constitution, the power of the government
is not transferable to other parties, and the WTO is
neither part of the US government nor accountable
to it. However, the WTO is in a unique position that
can issue mandates that might be contrary to a
country’s domestic laws such as tax laws.

Standardization of the mandates. The underlying
factors in agricultural trade disputes between the
US and the EU are not just about hormone-treated
beef, the banana tariff, or GM crops, but
fundamental differences in political and social–
cultural dimensions. The US and Canada have
extensive collaborative research in the area of GM
and hormone-treated foods. As a result, the food
regulatory agencies in these countries have worked
closely for the approval of these products (Isaac
et al., 2000). However, the EU directives regarding
the impact of new technologies on food and
environmental safety allow for no risk. In
addition, the EU member states are allowed to
impose unilateral trade barriers on items they
consider to have potential health hazards.
In the EU, the consumers’ concern over GM and
hormone-treated foods plays a much more pronounced role in the definition of safe agricultural
products. There is also a tremendous pressure by
environmental groups that are politically more
influential in the EU than in many other regions
of the world. Furthermore, EU directives have
more detailed policies regarding consumer and

environmental protection than other economic
integration pacts such as NAFTA.
Therefore, the social–cultural differences involving consumer and environmental factors and the
historic political ties of several European countries
to their past colonies in addition to differences in
political philosophies provide a fertile ground for
disputes and the lack of incentives to resolve them.
In addition, the vast differences between developing and developed countries regarding the standards of health and safety for consumers and the
physical environment do not lend themselves to
equitable power and the willingness to abide by
the SPS and TBS Agreements and the rulings of the
WTO. Adding to this dilemma is that the SPS
Agreement recognizes nation-specific food health
and safety regulations in regard to food additives.
Allowing differentiation in rules and regulations,
such as the standards of health and safety, will put
the developing countries in danger of becoming a
test or a dumping ground for the products considered unsafe in developed countries. With the
social–cultural, economic, technological, and political differences among the member countries, the
quandary over the imposition of international
mandates that may be against the domestic laws
of these countries, and the differentiation in the
acceptance of such mandates, makes the task of
harmonizing international trade rules and regulations a colossal one.

Analysis
The challenge for the WTO is how to be perceived
as an objective, equitable, and effective means for
trade dispute resolution while addressing the concerns of consumers, environmentalists, and developing countries in addition to getting the more
powerful nations to implement its rulings. Table 2
provides a list of the proposed recommendations to
address the issues that were discussed in the
previous sections of this paper.
Analysis – technical issues
To address the issues related to the technical issues,
rules, procedures, and the body of the language of
the WTO, several remedies are proposed as presented in Table 2.
To reduce the duration of the process of reviewing
a case and generating a report, the WTO needs to
eliminate the time-consuming practice of providing summarized reports of complaints to each
disputing party. Another means to keep the stated
time-line is changing the status of the third parties
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Table 2

1.

Recommendations to address the issues of the WTO

Analysis – technical issues:
Elimination of summary report
K Third party involvement
K Transparency in procedures
K Cooperative (national and WTO) standards of review
K Multilateral negotiations
K Semi-permanent panel
K Harmonization of standard of health
K Standardization of labeling of ‘‘novel products’’
K Elimination of non-compliant party
K

2.

Analysis – conceptual issues:
Aggregate retaliation
K Monetary retaliation
K Training
K Sharing information
K Expansion beyond supplier focus
K Formal representation of different interest groups
K

3.

Analysis – functional issues:
Collaborative and transparent procedures
K Multilateral negotiation
K Consensual partial implementation of the rulings
K Harmonization of rules and regulations
K Collaborative scientific research
K

and allowing them to join the main complainants
rather than filing separate similar complaints.
Implementation of such a rule can also reduce the
time needed to process the paperwork and to
review the complaints.
A major criticism of the WTO is the lack of
transparency in its procedures. Allowing a country
to ask for the reports by other members and
providing public access to the reports (with the
exemption of confidential parts) would be a step
toward making the WTO procedures more democratic and less secretive. The recent decision of the
WTO to provide access to such reports is a positive
step to address the criticism in regard to the lack of
transparency in its procedures.
As for the controversy over the standards utilized
in reviewing the facts by the panel and the
Appellate Body in rendering a decision – based on
the facts provided by the disputing parties or their
national laws vs the independent fact-finding and
utilization of the WTO rules in legal reviews – a
remedy would be to increase the appropriate level
of expertise of the members of the panel and the
Appellate Body. In the review of the facts involved
in a dispute, the WTO panel should combine the
expertise of the panel members with the findings at
the national level in rendering a decision. In cases
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that the disputing members do not have the
adequate scientific resources in providing the facts,
the expertise present in the WTO panel in conjunction with the expertise of appropriate international entities not involved in the dispute should
provide the standard of review.
For rendering the legal decisions by the Appellate
Body, in reviewing the standards, the relevant legal
national entities should be consulted. As to the
countries that lack the expertise in understanding
the complex international laws and regulations,
training and creating the legal expertise are very
much needed.
Another issue regarding rules and policies is
that the WTO allows only bilateral negotiations.
Replacement of bilateral negotiations with multilateral agreements and flexibility by recognizing
partial implementation of the remedies with the
agreement of the parties involved in a dispute
can reduce hostility and improve the stability and
harmonization of trade relationships, thereby
improving the effectiveness of the WTO in resolving trade disputes.
An additional concern regarding WTO rules
and procedures is the composition of the review
panel and its lack of permanency that do not allow
accumulation of expertise in resolving trade disputes. Establishment of semi-permanent panels can
address this issue and contribute to the enhancement of the expertise and the knowledge of the
panel members in dealing with complex trade
disputes.
Furthermore, the ambiguity of the body of the
language of the WTO is another technical issue that
needs to be addressed. Clarification of the SPS and
TBS articles on standards of health, degree of risk,
‘‘precautionary measures,’’ and definition of ‘‘novel
products’’ is imperative to address some of the
major issues that have risen in agricultural product
trade disputes as evident by the GM crop and the
hormone-treated beef cases.
The distinction between utilization of the scientific proof guidelines of the SPS and TBS Agreements for the purpose of trade protectionism vs the
utilization of these guidelines for the purpose of
current and future protection of consumers, the
environment, animals, and plants is a complex
issue. This is specifically important since the
agriculture industry has been one of the most
difficult to bring under international policies and
regulations. Most countries have protected the
agricultural sector through various economic and
political policies such as subsidies, import barriers,
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and tax breaks. In addition, other considerations
(e.g., environmental, consumer safety, and cultural
issues) have compounded the complexity of negotiating international policies and reducing the
barriers to trade for agricultural products.
The main focus of the Uruguay Round at Punta
del Este in September 1986 was to address trade
issues in agricultural sectors. Hence, clarification
and harmonization of standards of health for
humans, animals, and plants, and protection of
the environment are of the utmost importance to
ensure that developing countries would not be used
for testing and/or dumping of unsafe products in
addition to inhibiting different interpretations of
such standards and their utilization for supplierprotectionist measures.
Furthermore, clarification of the language of
labeling of food items and the concept of ‘‘novel
products’’ of the TBS Agreement need to be
addressed. The major factors underlying the lack
of detailed or uniform labeling of food products are
the diversity in the levels of education and awareness of consumers and the influence of environmental groups. Clarification of the definition of
‘‘novel products’’ and standardization of labeling of
food products are important steps to distinguish
between measures taken by different countries to
protect the future health of consumers and the
environment vs the supplier-protectionist acts.
A further technical issue hampering the effectiveness of the WTO as a trade dispute resolution body
is implementation of its rulings. As discussed
previously, such rulings can be open to interpretation and non-compliance by the losing party. To
address this issue, creating penalties such as
elimination of non-compliant countries from
further participation in the WTO dispute discussion
process is a tool that can be used to mandate that
the losing parties implement WTO’s rulings.

Analysis – conceptual issues
The inequality of political and economic power
between the developed and developing countries
has put a colossal burden on the WTO to be
considered an objective international entity to deal
with trade disputes. The US and the EU have
enough equilibrium in cross-Atlantic trading to
make the threat of sanctions or retaliation a reality.
However, such verdicts even if issued by the WTO
cannot be implemented by any effective means
when the parties to a trade dispute do not have a
balanced trade power. Even between the super
powers, the US and the EU, we have witnessed

trade disputes that have dragged on for a long
period of time and on occasions without any real
resolution.
Hence, the concern of the developing countries
as to their lack of retaliatory power is an important
matter that the WTO needs to remedy. Several
developing countries have proposed the replacement of sanctions and retaliatory acts with compensation and monetary damages and/or collective
retaliatory actions. Either of these changes can
assist in equalizing the retaliatory power of developing countries and their ability to collect compensation. Replacement of trade sanctions with
monetary damages can be advantageous to both
the economy and the harmed industry, since
retaliatory actions usually result in sanctions
against other industries than the industry under
dispute (Wuger, 2002).
Another issue related to the inequality of trade
power between the developed and developing
countries is the developing countries’ lack of legal
resources, knowledge, and expertise to deal with
complex trade disputes and international laws.
Training staff from developing countries to enable
them to work with the WTO policies and dispute
resolution tactics can enhance the capabilities of
these countries to deal with complex issues of
international trade disputes. In addition, sharing
information to highlight international trade
violations cannot only increase the level of expertise and knowledge regarding international trade
disputes, but it can also improve the lack of
‘‘transparency’’ in the WTO procedures that was
previously discussed.
Furthermore, a fundamental structural shortcoming in the conceptual underpinnings of the WTO is
its concentration on producer-induced barriers. The
traditional trade disputes have been usually based
on supplier-protectionist measures, such as implementation of tariffs and quotas, as in the case of the
US steel and the banana disputes. In such cases,
the quantification of the costs and benefits to the
parties involved are not difficult. However, as
manifested in the cases of the hormone-treated
beef and the GM crops, the new forms of trade
disputes are not necessarily based upon suppliermotivated trade barriers. Even though the calculation of the costs to the US as far as the ban on its
hormone-treated beef may be simple, the costs of
the potential health risks and environmental
damages are not as simple to quantify. Therefore,
inclusion of new directives to deal with trade
barriers created for the protection of other entities,
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such as consumers, and recognition of the legitimacy of the concerns of such groups is extremely
important for successful trade dispute resolutions
by the WTO and reducing hostility toward the
organization.
The acceptance of amicus curiae (friends of the
court) briefs by the non-governmental environmental organizations by the WTO in the dispute
over the GM products may be a way to admit
reports by the non-governmental agencies to the
WTO (Eckersley, 2007). Even though there was no
indication that in the case of the GM products
such reports influenced the decision of the WTO
panel, amicus curiae reports can be a mechanism to
allow accountability to the public and civil sectors
in the WTO dispute resolution processes (Eckersley,
2007).
Allowing interested non-governmental organizations and companies in addition to disputing
parties to attend meetings and have formal participation can bring multiple perspectives to a
dispute and facilitate rendering a more comprehensive decision. The inclusion of all legitimate
interested parties can create more assimilated
rather than discordant groups of complainants,
improve the transparency of procedures, expand
the WTO’s horizon beyond supplier-specific issues,
and enhance the inclusiveness of the WTO as an
international dispute resolution body.

Analysis – functional issues
The issues related to the functional role of the WTO
as a unique entity with the capability to issue
international trade mandates against the domestic
laws of a country are more complicated to remedy.
For the trading partners, powerful and less powerful, it is the predictability and stability in trade
relationships rather than volatility and instability
in trade policies that should be considered as the
building block of international trade organizations
such as the WTO. As discussed in the above
sections, implementation of transparency improvements, circulation of all reports to parties involved,
sharing information to delineate the international
trade violations, allowing for multilateral negotiations and partial implementation of rulings, and
inclusion of other entities and interest groups are
some of the measures that can facilitate trade
harmonization and more effective implementation
of the rulings of the WTO, specifically when the
rulings of the WTO entail modification of a
national law or a policy.
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Another factor that has created major conflicts
with domestic laws of countries is the ability of the
WTO to issue international safety and health
directives. This issue has been at the center of
hostile and antagonistic demonstrations against
the WTO. Countries such as Canada and the US are
in the forefront of bioengineering technologies.
Crops such as corn, canola, soybean, and cotton
have been GM for years in the US and Canada and
account for more than half the production of these
crops. With the current bioengineering research,
there will be more varieties of crops added to the
list of GM agricultural products. Increases in
productivity through drought and pest resistance,
modification and manipulation of the nutrients
within crops, and developing to larger cattle are
major incentives for the producers and suppliers of
agricultural products in private and public sectors
to research. However, the lack of decisive results of
research regarding the potential long-term impacts
of the genetic modification of crops on plants,
animal species, and the physical environment in
addition to the long-term impact of hormonetreated beef consumption on humans, specifically
children below the age of puberty, are factors that
have made consumers and environmental groups
raise serious concerns about the development of
GM crops and hormone-treated beef.
The benefits of the GM crops for drought
resistance and added nutrients can alleviate some
of the problems of the lack of irrigation and
adequate nutrition in poor countries, but the
long-term impact of such gene modification on
the food chain, environment, humans, and other
animal and plant species should be thoroughly
researched. The WTO needs to create and facilitate
avenues that allow the disputing parties to participate in joint scientific research, which can lessen
delays in gathering scientific information and
enhance better collaboration and understanding
among the disputing parties.

Conclusion
Review of the cases brought to the WTO indicates
successful dispute resolution of the cases that were
motivated by economic and/or political issues to
protect suppliers and where the impact or damages
were not difficult to quantify. The banana and steel
disputes are examples of such cases. In these cases,
calculation of the damages was more straight
forward and also the underlying economic and
political factors were not abstract and philosophically intangible constructs; as a result, these
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disputes were successfully resolved without a long
and exhaustive process. However, in the GM crop
and hormone-treated beef cases, in addition to
economic and political issues, other factors such as
social–cultural and philosophical differences, concerns regarding the protection of the physical
environment and consumers, and the potential
future impacts of new technologies were the
motivating factors underlying the disputes. In these
cases, with environmentalists and consumers comprising the major interest groups, the WTO had to
deal with complicated philosophical issues that
were difficult to measure, quantify, and resolve to
the satisfaction of all parties involved.
In the current global trade arena, in addition to
the governments, other special interest groups can
have a major impact on trade negotiations. At this
time, the policies of the WTO, like those of its
predecessor, GATT, are mostly based on supplydriven concepts. However, in the cases of GM crops
and hormone-treated beef, the composition of the
special interest groups was very different from
supplier-protectionist cases. Hence, the challenge
to global trade policies is how to incorporate

abstract ideologies into a field that has traditionally
and historically dealt with numbers and figures,
without encroaching upon the sensitive social–
cultural, environmental, health and safety, and
ethical principles and laws of a country.
As previously discussed, there are several tactics
that can enhance the potential of conflict resolution of the WTO (e.g., transparent process, change
in remedial avenues, and inclusion of other
parties). However, with the new biotechnological
advents, international health standards and risk
assessment should be a major building block for
dealing with trade barriers. Such standards should
be set through international collaborative scientific
research funded by international agencies with the
participation of scientists from a variety of nations.
Furthermore, successful resolution of disputes in
this era is not only a matter of cooperation among
governments, private businesses, and special interest groups, but also of the utmost importance is the
possession of in-depth information regarding international trade and specific issues under discussion
by the individuals acting as the consultants or
intermediaries between these parties and the WTO.

References
Boselovic, L. (2001). Steel industry revival may be around
corner. Pittsburg Post-Gazette (Pennsylvania), 9 December
2001, Sunday Five Star Edition, A-9.
Brewster, R. (2006). Rule-based dispute resolution in international trade law. Virginia Law Review, 92(251): 251–288.
Corbett, B. (2003). When the levies break. Ward’s Auto World,
39(3): 30–32.
Cyert, R.M. & Fruehan, R.J. (1996). Meeting the challenge: US
industry faces the 21st Century: The basic steel industry. US
Department of Commerce, Office of Technology Policy, December, 1–62.
Eckersley, R. (2007). A green public sphere in the WTO? The
amicus curiae interventions in the transatlantic biotech
dispute. European Journal of International Relations, 13(3):
329–356.
Footer, M. (2001). Developing country practice in the matter of
WTO dispute settlement. Journal of World Trade, 35(1): 55–98.
Hauser, H. & Zimmermann, T.A. (2003). The challenge of
reforming the WTO dispute settlement understanding. Intereconomics, 38(5): 241–245.
Hocking, B. & McGuire, S. (2002). Government-business
strategies in EU–US economic relations: The lessons of the
foreign sales corporation issue. Journal of Common Market
Studies, 40(3): 449–470.
Hsin, H. (2002). Bittersweet harvest: The debate over the
genetically modified crops. Harvard International Review,
24(1): 38–41.
Ierley, D. (2002). Defining the factors that influence developing
country compliance with and participation in the WTO dispute
settlement system: Another look at the dispute over bananas.
Law and Policy in International Business, 33(4): 615–652.
Isaac, G., Banerji, S. & Woolcock, S. (2000). International
trade policy and food safety. Consumer Policy Review, 10(6):
223–233.

Jacek, H. (2000). The role of organized business in the
formulation and implementation of regional trade agreements in North America. In J. Greenwood and H. Jacek (Eds),
Organized Business and the New Global Order, 39–58.
Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Jesdanun, A. (1999). Commerce finds steel dumping by
producers in six countries. The Augusta Chronicle, web posted
on 23 March 1999.
Kerr, W.A. & Hobbs, J.E. (2002). The North American–European
Union dispute over beef produced using growth hormones: A
major test for the new international trade regime. World
Economy, 25(2): 283–296.
Levin, C. (1999). Levin urges president to fight illegal dumping
of foreign steel into US market. Statements and news releases
from Sen. Levin Newsroom, 10 March 1999, p. 1.
Martinez, G. (2002). Bush breaks with position, moves to
protect steel industry. CQ Weekly, 60(10): 655–657.
McBride, S. (2001). Dispute settlement in the WTO: Backbone
of the global trading system or delegation of awesome
power. Law & Policy in International Business, 32(3):
643–675.
McMahon, J.A. (1998). The EC banana regime, the WTO rulings
and the ACP. Journal of the World Trade, 32(4): 101–114.
Oesch, M. (2003). Standards of review in WTO dispute
resolution. Journal of International and Economic Law, 8(3):
635–659.
Phelps, D. (2003). Buyers’ group says 201 tariffs cost 200K
metalworking jobs. Purchasing, 132(4): 15–17.
Purchasing (1999). Europe attacks use of 1916 US anti-dumping
law. 126(1): 23B27–23B34.
Roberts, D. (1998). Preliminary assessment of the effects of
the WTO agreement on the sanitary and phytosanitary
trade regulations. Journal of International Economic Law, 1(3):
377–405.

Organization Management Journal

Linking theory and practice

Minoo Tehrani

148

Stein, N. (2001). Yes, we have no profits. Fortune, 144(11):
182–190.
Stewart, T.P. & Karpel, A.A. (2000). Review of the dispute
settlement understanding: Operation of panels. Law and Policy
in International Business, 31(13): 593–655.
Wallach, L. (2000). Transparency in WTO dispute resolution. Law
and Policy in International Business, 31(3, spring): 773–777.
World Trade Organization (2006). WTO Legal Texts. Retrieved 20
March 2008, from http://www.wto.org.
World Trade Organization (2008). WTO Legal Texts. Retrieved 20
March 2008, from http://www.wto.org.
Wuger, D. (2002). The never ending story: The implementation
phase in the dispute between the EC and the United States on

Organization Management Journal

hormone-treated beef. Law and Policy in International Business,
33(4): 777–825.

About the author
Minoo Tehrani is a Professor of Management and
International Business and the Director of International Business Major at the Gabelli School of
Business, Roger Williams University. Her research
is in the areas of competitive strategies, strategic
alliances, and international business.

